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Showing posts with label America First. Show all posts
Showing posts with label America First. Show all posts

Monday, May 3, 2021

The virus is back! Bond formed through China’s support for India’s anti-epidemic fight overrides irrational public sentiments toward another

The virus is back, this time with more energy, tactics and camouflage.

We don't cough

No fever, it's joint pain, weakness,

Loss of appetite and Covid pneumonia!

Of course, the death rate is higher, it takes less time to get to the extreme. Sometimes no symptoms ... let's be careful ...

The strain is not domiciled in our nasopharyngeal region!

It directly affects the lungs, which means window periods are shortened.

I have seen a number of patients without fever, but an x-ray report shows moderate chest pneumonia!

The nasal swab is often negative for COVID19!

There are more and more false pharyngeal nasal tests COVID19) ... which means that the virus spreads directly to the lungs causing acute respiratory distress due to viral pneumonia! This explains why it has become acute and more fatal !!!Covid21

Be careful, avoid crowded places, wear a face mask, wash our hands often.

*WAVE* more deadly than the first. So we have to be very careful and *take every precaution.*

Indian mutated virus reached Malaysia!

Malaysia reports first case of Indian COVID-19 variant  ...

中国制氧机到了!印度网友啥反应?看清了美国的虚伪面目吗?

 

印度疫情“令人窒息” “美国优先”火上浇油





Indian people with COVID-19 symptoms queue for an Antigen Test at a government hospital. Photo: VCG

Indian people with COVID-19 symptoms queue for an Antigen Test at a government hospital. Photo: VCG

India’s COVID-19 epidemic has continued to rage on. China has become India’s largest supplier of crucial anti-epidemic supplies such as oxygen generators and ventilators. So far, China has provided India with more than 20,000 oxygen generators and 5,000 ventilators. India has submitted orders to Chinese companies to produce over 40,000 units of oxygen generators. However, Indian public opinion has not expressed its gratitude toward China for the emergency supplies, or it can be said that grateful voices have been very few. In contrast, many narratives have stressed that China's supplies are not aid, accusing China of “exploiting the opportunity to make money,” and claiming that it has "geopolitical intentions" to export these goods to India. Such rhetoric in India is in sharp contrast to their high-profile publicity on help from the US and the West. The Chinese people will certainly be disappointed after reading such opinions.

In terms of public opinion, Chinese and Indian societies have not got along well. Border tensions last year escalated sentiments on both sides, leading to a confrontation of public opinion. India has leaned closer to the US, further solidifying the social divide between China and India. This has become the background in which India is dealing with China in the face of a crisis.

China has made the greatest contribution to India’s current fight against the epidemic. Instead of being purely symbolic, China’s support and help has been very substantial. There is no atmosphere of public appreciation of China’s help in India. There is still a lot of resentment over border frictions and strategic hostility toward China. Out of a sense of pride, India has taken a lot of goods from Chinese companies, but has remained silent toward the fact. Hindustan Times has listed ten countries and regions that have started sending relief materials to India, and what kinds of materials they have supplied. But China is not on the list.

In the face of such a response from India, what should we do? Should we publicly accuse India of “repaying good with evil?” or turn our long-standing grievances toward India into mockery, even gloat about the Indian epidemic? I don’t think it is appropriate for us to be overly sensitive toward India’s reaction, especially going further to mock India's failure to fight the virus.

The official mindset of Chinese society toward India’s epidemic situation must be sympathetic and supportive of their battle against it, and this is indeed the case. I don’t think it’s proper for social media accounts of certain Chinese official institutions or other influential forces to mock India at present.

India has indeed done something wrong toward China. Even today when India is in trouble and China is lending it a helping hand, India still holds a grudge and remains narrow-minded. But currently, our prevailing attitude toward India should be still to show our sympathy and support, without being distracted by other sentiments. There is plenty of time and occasions for us to express our views regarding India. And we do not have to speak up upon them when India is struggling against the virus. We should not respond to radical voices in India, instead we should avoid escalating the spat between China and India among public opinion.

Although India has talked little about it, we have to say that China has done a magnificent job in supplying and supporting India. It is necessary for us to make the world more clearly aware of China’s actual role. Meanwhile, not like the US, the Indian government has not attacked China’s fight against the virus, nor has passed the buck to China. Currently, India is not only falling into a humanitarian disaster, but has become weak in the eyes of the rest of the world. The Chinese government proposed to offer India necessary support and assistance much earlier than Western countries. And our supplies have been provided to them with amazing speed, faster than any other country.

I understand that there are many voices and the public has their right to express various sentiments toward India. So do some figures who have many followers on social media platforms. But our public opinion, especially mainstream opinion, needs to follow the Chinese government’s narratives and moves as a whole, forming the tone of sympathy and support for India's fight against the virus. This is an indispensable part of China's national image.

We need to believe that actions speak louder than words. China’s supplies play a crucial role in India’s battle against the virus. We cannot ignore border frictions between China and India, but the bond formed through China’s substantial support to India’s anti-epidemic fight is also there. China and India are neighbors that cannot be moved away from each other. Apart from many frictions, China is India’s close neighbor which is better than a distant relative in the critical time of a crisis. As long as China does its best to bolster India’s fight against the virus, it will certainly become a factor in shaping Indians’ general perceptions of China.

China is a big country with a long history of civilization. Our national and international outlook has been shaped through thousands of years of experience. We should not be influenced by the logic of power which has been prevailing in the US and the West. When stepping up the construction of hard power, we cannot neglect the significance of “convincing people by virtue.” For China, virtue is not hypocrisy. Instead, it is our dignity and strength, which is one of the cornerstones of our international mobilization.

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A patient suffering from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) receives treatment inside the emergency ward at Holy Family hospital in New Delh.

Tuesday, March 9, 2021

STILL AMRICA FIRST IN TRADE

Domestic drive: The US has endorsed ‘Buy American’ policies, which would favour domestic producers but would be blatantly illegal under WTO rules.

 


https://youtu.be/vcn5Lxshw20 


US’s intention to destroy China will be a difficult process 

 

https://youtu.be/_3tjcoudjbI

US multilateralism is coming back in many areas but in trade, many retrograde policies of the past are continuing.


AFTER the end of the Trump presidency in January, multilateralists around the world heaved a collective sigh of relief.

Gone would be the wrecking ball aimed at international institutions.

Gone would be the go-it-alone approach to dealing with global problems. Gone would be policies towards the rest of the world premised on “America First”.

Gone, hopefully, would be the capricious trade wars, some of them directed at American allies.

To a large extent, these high hopes have proved justified.

Within its first 40 days, the Biden administration has reversed many of its predecessor’s disengagements from multilateral institutions and processes.

It has rejoined the Paris Agreement on climate change, which the United States had abandoned in 2017.

It walked back to former president Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the World Health Organisation (WHO), which was due to take effect from July 6.

It has pledged US$4bil (RM16bil) for the WHO-sponsored Covax initiative which aims to distribute Covid-19 vaccines to the developing world, which the Trump administration refused to join.

It has agreed to endorse an allocation of special drawing rights – the International Monetary Fund’s hard currency – which would provide additional resources to poor countries without adding to their debt, and which former Treasury secretary Steve Mnuchin had declined to support.

Given that the World Bank is the world’s biggest financier of climate change-related investments, its president David Malpass reasonably expects that the Biden administration, for which battling climate change is a priority, will be supportive of its mission.

The administration has also vowed the US’ “unshakeable” commitment to Nato, which Trump had derided as an outdated organisation that imposes excessive burdens on the US.

But there is one critical area where the Biden administration is hesitant to support multilateralism, and that is trade.

Here, multilateralists can be grateful for some small mercies.

At least the administration has affirmed its commitment to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – the custodian and enforcer of world trade rules – which the Trump administration all but ignored during the last four years and even threatened to leave.

It has also broken the impasse over WTO’s leadership, by endorsing the candidacy of Nigerian-American economist Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala for the post of directorgeneral, which was supported by the majority of the WTO’s 164 members, but which the Trump administration had blocked.

So, after being leaderless for almost six months, the WTO now at least has someone in charge.

Modest ambitions

But beyond that, and judging by actions rather than words, the multilateralist ambitions of the Biden administration on trade appear modest.

It has made clear that it will not pursue any trade agreements until it restores America’s competitiveness by investing trillions of dollars in areas such as energy, education and infrastructure.

It has endorsed “Buy American” policies, which would favour domestic producers and would be blatantly illegal under WTO rules.

Citing “systemic problems”, it has continued the Trump administration’s policy of blocking appointments of new judges to the WTO’s appellate body, which functions as a “supreme court” that adjudicates trade disputes.

The body has been unable to issue any judgments since Dec 11, 2019, because it did not have the minimum of three members required to issue a ruling.

Currently, with all judges having completed their terms, there is not a single judge on the body. This means that any appeal against a judgment by a lower panel at the WTO disappears into legal limbo, and the judgment is not binding.

In September last year, a lower panel ruled in favour of China, which made the case that the 25% tariffs levied by the US in June and September 2018 violated the WTO’s cardinal principle of non-discrimination.

The US is appealing that judgment, but the appeal cannot be heard, as the US would know, so the tariffs will remain in place.

Indeed, the Biden administration appears in no hurry to lift the Trump administration’s tariffs on China, all of which are likely to be WTO-illegal, according to trade experts.

It wants to use these tariffs as leverage to secure concessions from Beijing, including its compliance with the phase one trade deal negotiated by the Trump administration under which China was supposed to buy US$ 200 bil worth of US goods and services split over last year and this year, but is falling short of the target.

It has also continued the Trump administration’s policy of designating Hong Kong’s exports as “Made in China”, citing “national security” concerns – which means that in the US view, that issue, too, cannot be adjudicated by the WTO.

In short, a return to multilateralism on trade does not seem to be a priority for the Biden administration.

‘Elephant in the room’

The rise of China is one of the main sources of this reticence.

Like the Republicans, Democrats believe that the WTO is not fit for purpose in dealing with all of China’s alleged trade malpractices.

The case for this is well articulated in a 2016 paper by Harvard Law School Prof Mark Wu, now a senior adviser to the US Trade Representative’s office.

He argues that the main problem is that WTO rules – which were crafted before China joined the organisation – were not made with China’s distinctive economic system in mind.

WTO rules can address only those among China’s trade malpractices which are shared by other countries – such as requiring foreign investors to partner with local firms and buy from local suppliers, or granting exclusive rights to local firms to import or sell goods in the local market – which are practices that are not unique to China, and for which case law already exists.

But problems arise in cases where the boundaries between state and private enterprises are blurred, as is often the case in China. It is then not easy to judge whether a preferential transaction is of a private commercial nature – which falls outside the WTO rules – or amounts to a state subsidy.

At the heart of the problem is what constitutes a “public body”, which in China is not as clear as in other countries.

It is widely accepted, including by WTO itself, that WTO rules need to be updated, not only relating to China but also to issues such as digital trade, competition, services, labour and the environment.

But China, which is involved in the majority of trade disputes involving major economic powers, is the “elephant in the room”.

However, updating the rules should not mean sidelining the WTO in the meantime, which is what seems to be happening.

In a departure from the unilateral approach taken by the Trump administration, the Biden administration says it plans to deal with China’s trade practices in concert with other countries.

But there is no better way to do this than in a multilateral forum like the WTO, which applies a core set of principles to trade disputes such as non-discrimination, has mechanisms to monitor and enforce its rules and which would accommodate the concerns of multiple countries, which is how multilateralism should work.

Besides, China has a good record of complying with WTO rulings that go against it, and not such a good record of caving in to bilateral pressures.

Judicial paralysis

Shutting down the WTO’s judicial function by effectively neutralising its appellate body is especially ill advised.

Some concerns about the way the body functions and its alleged “judicial overreach” may be legitimate, but even if so, this applies only to a minority of cases that the body has adjudicated.

Disabling the WTO’s appellate body prevents the majority of cases, including those unrelated to China, from being resolved.

Besides, for all the criticisms levelled against it, the appellate body has a proud record.

In its 25 years of operation, it has resolved 195 disputes compared with around 160 cases completed in 74 years by the International Court of Justice, with 15 standing judges. Moreover, it has disposed of cases within a few months on average, compared with a few years in the case of other international adjudicating bodies.

Recounting these achievements in her farewell speech on Nov 30 last year, the last appellate judge to finish her term, Dr Zhao Hong, pointed out: “Though there was room to improve, the appellate body distinguishes itself for its outstanding performance among all international adjudicating bodies.”

By continuing to paralyse its functioning, the Biden administration undermines multilateralism and perpetuates the law of the jungle on trade issues, where might is right.

So while the administration has made a good start by re-embracing multilateralism in many areas, its trade policies still leave much to be desired.

-By VIKRAM KHANNA— The Straits Times/ANN



Diplomatic realpolitik

 

AS double-think runs wild in the White House, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) of Saudi Arabia must be enjoying a quiet chuckle. Diplomatic realpolitik has been accorded precedence over the severe action that was expected of President Joe Biden in the context of the US intelligence report that the Crown Prince was complicit in the ghastly killing of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018.

The Washington Post columnist was allegedly drugged and his body dismembered. Every tenet of human rights was thus violated.

By advancing what they call a “free pass” to MBS, America’s President has proffered a feeble excuse to justify his defence of the de facto leader of the desert kingdom. Biden, who had referred to Saudi Arabia as a “pariah kingdom with no redeeming social value” in course of his election campaign, has now softened his stance to a dramatic degree.

It thus comes about that in the somewhat surprising reckoning of the US President, the price of directly penalising Saudi Arabia’s crown prince is “too high”.

He may be right when viewed through the prism of certitudes of foreign policy.

The US President was reportedly convinced by his newly formed national security team that there was no way to formally bar the Saudi crown prince from entering the United States or to take a call on the criminal charges against him.

Altogether, it was feared by the current US administration that a drastic reprisal would have breached the equation with one of America’s key Arab allies, not to discount the flutter within the Arab region generally.

There is said to have been a consensus in the White House that the price of that breach was quite “simply too high” in terms of Saudi cooperation in the fight against terrorism and in confronting Iran.

Biden had been urged by a section of the establishment to at least impose the same travel restrictions against the Crown Prince as the Trump administration had imposed on others involved in the plot.

The White House appears to have drawn a fine distinction between MBS and the Saudi military. While the Crown Prince is unlikely to be invited to the United States in the immediate perspective, the establishment has denied that the Saudi ruler is being given a “pass”.

It is pretty obvious though, that the coveted International Visitor Program (IVP) will not be denied to the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince. Going by the terms of protocol, he may yet be treated as a state guest in America.-Reuter

 

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America’s 5 Stages of Grief Over China’s Rise; Trump and wife test positive for Covid-19

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The hegemonic anxiety of America First

 

 

The root of the matter: shame - shamefulness and shamelessness

Saturday, January 11, 2020

US gains limited from changed China policy


 

The year 2019 has been one in which US sought to reconstruct its relations with China.

First, the US reset the premise of its policies toward China. From former president Bill Clinton to Barack Obama, Washington used to consider living with a rising China conditionally as the precondition; but since Donald Trump took office, he has changed the relatively friendly premise into a hostile one. Trying to slow down China's development and preventing the country from surpassing or even replacing the US have become the real intention of his China policy.

Second, the US reframed its relations with China, taking economic and trade ties as the turning point, as well as putting in more efforts in diplomacy, security, politics and culture. The key tools in its reconstruction of economic and trade ties were the war of tariffs, technology and finance.

During 2019, the trade war launched by the US against China saw many ups and downs. The number of products on which the two sides slapped duties reached an unprecedented scale. With the escalating tech war against China, the US Commerce Department added Huawei and 70 affiliates to its "entity list." Besides, China was listed as a currency manipulator by the US Department of Treasury.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration carried out a whole-of-government approach to compete with China and imposed all-round pressure on China.

The US has continued to meddle in Taiwan-related affairs. The Trump administration approved the sale of 66 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in August, the biggest military transaction between the US and Taiwan. Then US National Security Advisor John Bolton's meeting with Taiwan's National Security Council (NSC) head David Lee in the White House in May indicated the upgrade of US-Taiwan relations, which happened for the first time since 1950s.

Most seriously, the US was trying to promote Taiwan's status as a sovereign state. In the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report issued by US Department of Defense, Taiwan was publicly listed as a country; and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs was changed into Taiwan Council for US Affairs.

In 2019, US so-called freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea were much more aggressive. The China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was also besieged and smeared by the US. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy is meant to counter China's BRI.

Additionally, the US has stepped up competition with China politically and ideologically and kept attacking China's political system.

In terms of the issues of Xinjiang and Hong Kong, US interference was way more blatant than before. The US even passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, in order to legalize its future interference in the Hong Kong issue. Moreover, the US attacked China's governance in Xinjiang. Not only did the Ministry of Commerce impose export control over 28 Chinese business entities, but the US Department of State also announced visa restrictions against Chinese officials and their relatives. US Congress, furthermore, passed the so-called Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, keeping up the pressure on China even more.

The series of measures the Trump administration employed to restructure the China-US relationship framework are aggressive.

The Trump administration is trying to change the way China and US interact. It believes that Washington should abandon the engagement policy and cooperation should give way to strategic competition and that the US must pressure China to make concessions. That being the case, the Trump administration has changed the approach of engagement and hedging, reduced engagement and cooperation, and increased confrontation and conflicts with China.

When some hawks within the Trump government talk about China-US competition, what they really want are confrontation and conflict. Many working-level dialogue mechanisms established during the George W. Bush and Obama administrations are no longer in operation. Now Washington resorts to trade, technological and financial wars as well as sanctions. How far can the US go in this way?

First, it depends on how much price the US is willing to pay. Competition, decoupling, confrontation, and non-cooperation all come at a price. The US-launched trade war against China has impacted US agricultural and manufacturing industries and forced consumers to pay more, while the technological war has put the US high-tech industry under risk of losing the Chinese market. Escalating military competition with China means a significant increase in US military expenditure. Restricting China-US people-to-people exchanges will also cause losses to American universities and research institutions.

In fact, with the negative effects of the Trump administration's China policy increasingly becoming apparent, doubts within the US have grown. Although the US elites have generally reached a consensus on a tougher stance against China, they have yet to agree on how much price the US can pay.

Second, China-US relations are the result of bilateral interactions and cannot be unilaterally decided by the US. Facing heightened US pressure, China is exploring more effective ways to respond. Beijing is not afraid of competition.

Finally, the attitudes of the international community and the US allies matter. The China policy and other foreign policies of the Trump administration not only aimed at maximizing US interests, but also have the features of protectionism and unilateralism. The trade war against China has damaged global industrial and value chains, undermining the interests of other countries including US allies.

To sum up, although the US has benefited from its China policy recalibration, its gains are limited. How far will the US move to restructure its relations with China go? It hinges on the changes in US domestic politics as well as China's will and art in wrangling with the US.

By Wu Xinbo Source:Global Times - The author is dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University.


Read more:

China's strategic willpower leads to progress

China is not the most powerful country. But it is strong enough to defend its philosophy of seeking truth from facts. Sometimes, justice and correctness need to be proven through games and tested by time. China has the ability to create conditions for that. This is perhaps what strategic willpower means.

How should China develop in the 2020s?

China has been moving forward. It is a bit tired, but China has been doing great.

US gains limited from changed China policy


 

The year 2019 has been one in which US sought to reconstruct its relations with China.

First, the US reset the premise of its policies toward China. From former president Bill Clinton to Barack Obama, Washington used to consider living with a rising China conditionally as the precondition; but since Donald Trump took office, he has changed the relatively friendly premise into a hostile one. Trying to slow down China's development and preventing the country from surpassing or even replacing the US have become the real intention of his China policy.

Second, the US reframed its relations with China, taking economic and trade ties as the turning point, as well as putting in more efforts in diplomacy, security, politics and culture. The key tools in its reconstruction of economic and trade ties were the war of tariffs, technology and finance.

During 2019, the trade war launched by the US against China saw many ups and downs. The number of products on which the two sides slapped duties reached an unprecedented scale. With the escalating tech war against China, the US Commerce Department added Huawei and 70 affiliates to its "entity list." Besides, China was listed as a currency manipulator by the US Department of Treasury.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration carried out a whole-of-government approach to compete with China and imposed all-round pressure on China.

The US has continued to meddle in Taiwan-related affairs. The Trump administration approved the sale of 66 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in August, the biggest military transaction between the US and Taiwan. Then US National Security Advisor John Bolton's meeting with Taiwan's National Security Council (NSC) head David Lee in the White House in May indicated the upgrade of US-Taiwan relations, which happened for the first time since 1950s.

Most seriously, the US was trying to promote Taiwan's status as a sovereign state. In the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report issued by US Department of Defense, Taiwan was publicly listed as a country; and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs was changed into Taiwan Council for US Affairs.

In 2019, US so-called freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea were much more aggressive. The China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was also besieged and smeared by the US. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy is meant to counter China's BRI.

Additionally, the US has stepped up competition with China politically and ideologically and kept attacking China's political system.

In terms of the issues of Xinjiang and Hong Kong, US interference was way more blatant than before. The US even passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, in order to legalize its future interference in the Hong Kong issue. Moreover, the US attacked China's governance in Xinjiang. Not only did the Ministry of Commerce impose export control over 28 Chinese business entities, but the US Department of State also announced visa restrictions against Chinese officials and their relatives. US Congress, furthermore, passed the so-called Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, keeping up the pressure on China even more.

The series of measures the Trump administration employed to restructure the China-US relationship framework are aggressive.

The Trump administration is trying to change the way China and US interact. It believes that Washington should abandon the engagement policy and cooperation should give way to strategic competition and that the US must pressure China to make concessions. That being the case, the Trump administration has changed the approach of engagement and hedging, reduced engagement and cooperation, and increased confrontation and conflicts with China.

When some hawks within the Trump government talk about China-US competition, what they really want are confrontation and conflict. Many working-level dialogue mechanisms established during the George W. Bush and Obama administrations are no longer in operation. Now Washington resorts to trade, technological and financial wars as well as sanctions. How far can the US go in this way?

First, it depends on how much price the US is willing to pay. Competition, decoupling, confrontation, and non-cooperation all come at a price. The US-launched trade war against China has impacted US agricultural and manufacturing industries and forced consumers to pay more, while the technological war has put the US high-tech industry under risk of losing the Chinese market. Escalating military competition with China means a significant increase in US military expenditure. Restricting China-US people-to-people exchanges will also cause losses to American universities and research institutions.

In fact, with the negative effects of the Trump administration's China policy increasingly becoming apparent, doubts within the US have grown. Although the US elites have generally reached a consensus on a tougher stance against China, they have yet to agree on how much price the US can pay.

Second, China-US relations are the result of bilateral interactions and cannot be unilaterally decided by the US. Facing heightened US pressure, China is exploring more effective ways to respond. Beijing is not afraid of competition.

Finally, the attitudes of the international community and the US allies matter. The China policy and other foreign policies of the Trump administration not only aimed at maximizing US interests, but also have the features of protectionism and unilateralism. The trade war against China has damaged global industrial and value chains, undermining the interests of other countries including US allies.

To sum up, although the US has benefited from its China policy recalibration, its gains are limited. How far will the US move to restructure its relations with China go? It hinges on the changes in US domestic politics as well as China's will and art in wrangling with the US.

By Wu Xinbo Source:Global Times - The author is dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University.


Read more:

China's strategic willpower leads to progress

China is not the most powerful country. But it is strong enough to defend its philosophy of seeking truth from facts. Sometimes, justice and correctness need to be proven through games and tested by time. China has the ability to create conditions for that. This is perhaps what strategic willpower means.

How should China develop in the 2020s?

China has been moving forward. It is a bit tired, but China has been doing great.

Phase one deal to stabilize China-US ties

After China and the US signed their phase one economic and trade agreement in the White House on Wednesday, their relations have stabilized and been prevented from getting worse, and created a friendly atmosphere for the phase two negotiations that include tougher issues, Chinese experts said on Thursday. They said that China should be cautiously optimistic as US strategic pressure against China will remain unchanged.

Monday, September 2, 2019

Inside America's Meddling Machine destabilizing the world order

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.