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Showing posts with label Thailand. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Thailand. Show all posts

Monday, September 13, 2021

Delta variant threatens Asean-5 recovery


IN the first half of 2021, Asean-5 countries, comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines experienced strong, export-driven growth. However, renewed lockdowns amid significant outbreaks of Covid-19 Delta variant cases have dampened business sentiment and consumer spending in this region.

According to the Institute of International Finance (IIF), recovery will likely slow markedly in the second half of 2021 for Asean5.

“Given the rising number of Covid-19 infections, renewed pandemic containment measures, and the slow pace of vaccinations, authorities in Asean-5 countries have been revising down official growth forecasts,” IIF said.

The IIF said it would likely cut its gross domestic product (GDP) growth forecast for region.

In May, it forecast a GDP growth of 5.2% for 2021 and 5.4% for 2022.

Against the backdrop of current economic challenges, the IIF said it expected Asean-5 central banks to maintain their accommodative monetary policy stances well into 2022.

“Most of the countries are still experiencing inflation within the respective target ranges, except for the Philippines,” the IIF said.

“Fiscal policy will also continue to be supportive. While Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have announced fiscal consolidation plans, the pace of adjustment will be modest,” it added.

The IIF noted that due to their economic structure, Asean-5 countries benefitted strongly from the global demand recovery, with exports up sharply in the first half of 2021, particularly in the area of electronic appliances (Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) and commodities (Indonesia and Vietnam).

“Looking ahead, the next stage of the global recovery will likely benefit services rather than goods and, thus, provide less of a boost to Asean-5 economies,” it said.

“Furthermore, the recovery in tourism in the five countries has been slower than our already-cautious forecast in the spring, with the Delta variant posing a new challenge to the sector,” it added
 
 

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Saturday, March 28, 2020

Stimulus packages avert 1930s-style depression but cannot prevent business closures, save jobs as supply-demand dynamics collapse

Click to Enlarge

 Malaysia's RM250bil Funding the fight against Covid-19; Penang unveils RM75mil economic stimulus package 

WHEN the conoravirus (Covid-19) first hit the news sometime in December last year, nobody would have thought that it would lead to a global crisis. Two weeks ago, many were staring at a 1930s kind of depression as the world was hit by the perfect storm.

Global trade and supply chain were only getting to terms with the end of the prolonged US-China trade war, when it was hit by a combination of the Covid-19 pandemic and collapse in crude oil prices.

The perfect storm for capital markets that comes once in a decade started to unravel.

The 2008 financial crisis broke down the US financial system. The banks in Malaysia were well prepared for the crisis after having overcome similar problems in 1998. It was different in other parts of the world, especially the United States and Europe. The Federal Reserve and the European Union printed money and other measures to save the banking system.

This perfect storm of 2020 has dismantled the fundamental pillars of global economy – the forces of supply and demand. The consequences are being felt at businesses – whether small or big.

Demand has collapsed overnight across the economy. From tourism to travel, manufacturing to logistics and food and beverage businesses were all forced to shut down to combat Covid-19.

Supply chains continue to be disrupted. Logistic companies are operating at a quarter of their capacity. Factories are shut down because of inadequate components or raw materials. The Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) contends that cargo is not moving out of ports as fast as it wished to.

Governments had no choice but to announce stimulus measures, which would help alleviate the hardship suffered by workers and companies affected by the strict measures undertaken by the government to contain the virus.

So far, the centrepiece of Malaysia’s stimulus package is to suspend mortgage and hire-purchase payments on houses and vehicles for six months. Those with credit card repayments can convert their outstanding balances to term loan.

Another firepower that the government has unleashed is handing some RM10bil into the hands of the people. The money will come in direct handouts to people in the B40 and M40 groups, civil servants and individuals.

Like many other stimulus packages, the government has also allocated RM5.9bil to subsidise the wage bill of 3.3 million workers earning less than RM4,000 per month. The subsidy of RM600 will go on for three months provided the company does not retrench the workers or cut their salaries.

Some RM54bil are available for businesses affected by the restrictions on operations imposed to contain the Covid-19 pandemic. Among the beneficiaries are those in the services sector from restaurants to logistics companies and some small and medium enterprises in the manufacturing sector. The companies now are able to tap on government guaranteed loans under procedures that are supervised by Danajamin.

The benefits, especially the six-month suspension of mortgage and hire-purchase loans would easily increase by more than 50% of the disposable incomes of some 80% of families.

The additional measures announced yesterday would capture the informal workforce who are out of the financial system. Those without a car or housing loan would get something from the government to help tide over the tough period.

The measures are a relieve to stop the economy from going into a tailspin. It is to inject confidence and ensure people keep spending so that we do not end up in a 1930s kind of depression. It is needed to ensure the group of people who have been paying loans are comforted that they have money to put food on the table.

Anybody still debating on the benefits of the moratorium on loans, should know that cash money in hand today is more valuable than having the same amount a year from now.

Interest rates for mortgages and hire purchase are already low and will be low for the next few years. It will not make a difference if loans are to be extended by another six months.

So if anybody wants to give you money at low interest rates, just take it and settle the more expensive loans such as personal financing and credit card bills, unless you have so much money that you don’t need the extra cash flow at the moment.

However, the synchronised stimulus packages around the world would not resuscitate the collapse in the supply-demand forces of the economy. It would neither stimulate demand nor help prompt supply over the longer term.

The stimulus package has given Malaysia a six-month grace period to adjust to the reality of the new economic world. It may take up to a year before things get back to normal. Until then, businesses will continue to suffer and unemployment will go up. Certainly, companies are not going to hire for some time, even in services such as restaurants and retail outlets.

People are not going to frequent restaurants and splurge on non-essential items until they are sure that their jobs and income levels are secure. Spending patterns will change as nobody knows how long it would take for normalcy to emerge.

In the meantime, companies will not know how many staff to retain. A logistics company operating in the KL International Airport is only running four out of the 70 lorries. The company’s fleet of courier vans servicing international clients is still ongoing but the number of trips are reducing.

The owner has told employees that they would get their full salary for the month of March and half salary in April if the Movement Control Order continues beyond mid-April as cash flows are reduced.

The magnitude of the problem is bigger in larger companies. Take for instance AIRASIA Group that employs 29,000 people. Based on the 2018 annual report, its staff cost is RM1.7bil and leasing charges are a further RM1.2bil. It has cash of RM3.2bil. Generally, its burn rate is easily RM250mil a month.

AirAsia has suspended operations in Malaysia until April 21. Assuming operations start after April 21, it is not going to be normal as many countries are in lockdown mode. People are not going to travel unless necessary. The question is how long can AirAsia keep paying staff full salaries?

The common theme in the stimulus packages of the countries is to put money in the hands of the people through various measures, which Malaysia has done.

The United States wants to send out cheques to households while the UK will bear 80% of wages up to a sum of £2,500 per month.

Even Italy, which is the country that is hardest hit by Covid-19 in Europe, came up with a US$28bil package that includes suspension of any firing procedures. The government has said that nobody must lose their jobs because of the virus.

It is easy for the government to say that nobody should lose their jobs because of Covid-19 pandemic. It is hard for the private sector to keep paying staff salaries and prevent closures if the supply-demand dynamics is not mended.

The supply-demand forces in the economy will only come back when the Covid-19 threat abates. Make no mistake about the reality.

The views expressed are the writer’s own.

By M. Shanmugam



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Monday, July 3, 2017

The Asian financial crisis - 20 years later


https://youtu.be/eocI_JZK5_g

East Asian Economies Remain Diverse

It is useful to reflect on whether lessons have been learnt and if the countries are vulnerable to new crises.


IT’S been 20 years since the Asian financial crisis struck in July 1997. Since then, there has been an even bigger global financial crisis, starting in 2008. Will there be another crisis?

The Asian crisis began when speculators brought down the Thai baht. Within months, the currencies of Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia were also affected. The East Asian Miracle turned into an Asian Financial Nightmare.

Despite the affected countries receiving only praise before the crisis, weaknesses had built up, including current account deficits, low foreign reserves and high external debt.

In particular, the countries had recently liberalised their financial system in line with international advice. This enabled local private companies to freely borrow from abroad, mainly in US dollars. Companies and banks in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand had in each country rapidly accumulated over a hundred billion dollars of external loans. This was the Achilles heel that led their countries to crisis.

These weaknesses made the countries ripe for speculators to bet against their currencies. When the governments used up their reserves in a vain attempt to stem the currency fall, three of the countries ran out of foreign exchange.

They went to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for bailout loans that carried draconian conditions that worsened their economic situation.

Malaysia was fortunate. It did not seek IMF loans. The foreign reserves had become dangerously low but were just about adequate. If the ringgit had fallen a bit further, the danger line would have been breached.

After a year of self-imposed austerity measures, Malaysia dramatically switched course and introduced a set of unorthodox policies.

These included pegging the ringgit to the dollar, selective capital controls to prevent short-term funds from exiting, lowering interest rates, increasing government spending and rescuing failing companies and banks. This was the opposite of orthodoxy and the IMF policies. The global establishment predicted the sure collapse of the Malaysian economy.

But surprisingly, the economy recovered even faster and with fewer losses than the other countries. Today, the Malaysian measures are often cited as a successful anti-crisis strategy.

The IMF itself has changed a little. It now includes some capital controls as part of legitimate policy measures.

The Asian countries, vowing never to go to the IMF again, built up strong current account surpluses and foreign reserves to protect against bad years and keep off speculators. The economies recovered, but never back to the spectacular 7% to 10% pre-crisis growth rates.

Then in 2008, the global financial crisis erupted with the United States as its epicentre. The tip of the iceberg was the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the massive loans given out to non-credit-worthy house-buyers.

The underlying cause was the deregulation of US finance and the freedom with which financial institutions could devise all kinds of manipulative schemes and “financial products” to draw in unsuspecting customers. They made billions of dollars but the house of cards came tumbling down.

To fight the crisis, the US, under President Barack Obama, embarked first on expanding government spending and then on financial policies of near-zero interest rates and “quantitative easing”, with the Federal Reserve pumping trillions of dollars into the US banks.

It was hoped the cheap credit would get consumers and businesses to spend and lift the economy. But instead, a significant portion of the trillions went via investors into speculative activities, including abroad to emerging economies.

Europe, on the verge of recession, followed the US with near zero interest rates and large quantitative easing, with limited results. The US-Europe financial crisis affected Asian countries in a limited way through declines in export growth and commodity prices. The large foreign reserves built up after the Asian crisis, plus the current account surplus situation, acted as buffers against external debt problems and kept speculators at bay.

Just as important, hundreds of billions of funds from the US and Europe poured into Asia yearly in search of higher yields. These massive capital inflows helped to boost Asian countries’ growth, but could cause their own problems.

First, they led to asset bubbles or rapid price increases of houses and the stock markets, and the bubbles may burst when they are over-ripe.

Second, many of the portfolio investors are short-term funds looking for quick profit, and they can be expected to leave when conditions change.

Third, the countries receiving capital inflows become vulnerable to financial volatility and economic instability.

If and when investors pull some or a lot of their money out, there may be price declines, inadequate replenishment of bonds, and a fall in the levels of currency and foreign reserves.

A few countries may face a new financial crisis.

A new vulnerability in many emerging economies is the rapid build-up of external debt in the form of bonds denominated in the local currency.

The Asian crisis two decades ago taught that over-borrowing in foreign currency can create difficulties in debt repayment should the local currency level fall.

To avoid this, many countries sold bonds denominated in the local currency to foreign investors.

However, if the bonds held by foreigners are large in value, the country will still be vulnerable to the effects of a withdrawal.

As an example, almost half of Malaysian government securities, denominated in ringgit, are held by foreigners.

Though the country does not face the risk of having to pay more in ringgit if there is a fall in the local currency, it may have other difficulties if foreigners withdraw their bonds.

What is the state of the world economy, what are the chances of a new financial crisis, and how would the Asian countries like Malaysia fare?

These are big and relevant questions to ponder 20 years after the start of the Asian crisis and nine years after the global crisis.

But we will have to consider them in another article.


By Martin Khor Global Trend

Martin Khor (director@southcentre.org) is executive director of the South Centre. The views expressed here are entirely his own.


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The Asian financial crisis - 20 years later


https://youtu.be/eocI_JZK5_g

East Asian Economies Remain Diverse

It is useful to reflect on whether lessons have been learnt and if the countries are vulnerable to new crises.


IT’S been 20 years since the Asian financial crisis struck in July 1997. Since then, there has been an even bigger global financial crisis, starting in 2008. Will there be another crisis?

The Asian crisis began when speculators brought down the Thai baht. Within months, the currencies of Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia were also affected. The East Asian Miracle turned into an Asian Financial Nightmare.

Despite the affected countries receiving only praise before the crisis, weaknesses had built up, including current account deficits, low foreign reserves and high external debt.

In particular, the countries had recently liberalised their financial system in line with international advice. This enabled local private companies to freely borrow from abroad, mainly in US dollars. Companies and banks in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand had in each country rapidly accumulated over a hundred billion dollars of external loans. This was the Achilles heel that led their countries to crisis.

These weaknesses made the countries ripe for speculators to bet against their currencies. When the governments used up their reserves in a vain attempt to stem the currency fall, three of the countries ran out of foreign exchange.

They went to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for bailout loans that carried draconian conditions that worsened their economic situation.

Malaysia was fortunate. It did not seek IMF loans. The foreign reserves had become dangerously low but were just about adequate. If the ringgit had fallen a bit further, the danger line would have been breached.

After a year of self-imposed austerity measures, Malaysia dramatically switched course and introduced a set of unorthodox policies.

These included pegging the ringgit to the dollar, selective capital controls to prevent short-term funds from exiting, lowering interest rates, increasing government spending and rescuing failing companies and banks. This was the opposite of orthodoxy and the IMF policies. The global establishment predicted the sure collapse of the Malaysian economy.

But surprisingly, the economy recovered even faster and with fewer losses than the other countries. Today, the Malaysian measures are often cited as a successful anti-crisis strategy.

The IMF itself has changed a little. It now includes some capital controls as part of legitimate policy measures.

The Asian countries, vowing never to go to the IMF again, built up strong current account surpluses and foreign reserves to protect against bad years and keep off speculators. The economies recovered, but never back to the spectacular 7% to 10% pre-crisis growth rates.

Then in 2008, the global financial crisis erupted with the United States as its epicentre. The tip of the iceberg was the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the massive loans given out to non-credit-worthy house-buyers.

The underlying cause was the deregulation of US finance and the freedom with which financial institutions could devise all kinds of manipulative schemes and “financial products” to draw in unsuspecting customers. They made billions of dollars but the house of cards came tumbling down.

To fight the crisis, the US, under President Barack Obama, embarked first on expanding government spending and then on financial policies of near-zero interest rates and “quantitative easing”, with the Federal Reserve pumping trillions of dollars into the US banks.

It was hoped the cheap credit would get consumers and businesses to spend and lift the economy. But instead, a significant portion of the trillions went via investors into speculative activities, including abroad to emerging economies.

Europe, on the verge of recession, followed the US with near zero interest rates and large quantitative easing, with limited results. The US-Europe financial crisis affected Asian countries in a limited way through declines in export growth and commodity prices. The large foreign reserves built up after the Asian crisis, plus the current account surplus situation, acted as buffers against external debt problems and kept speculators at bay.

Just as important, hundreds of billions of funds from the US and Europe poured into Asia yearly in search of higher yields. These massive capital inflows helped to boost Asian countries’ growth, but could cause their own problems.

First, they led to asset bubbles or rapid price increases of houses and the stock markets, and the bubbles may burst when they are over-ripe.

Second, many of the portfolio investors are short-term funds looking for quick profit, and they can be expected to leave when conditions change.

Third, the countries receiving capital inflows become vulnerable to financial volatility and economic instability.

If and when investors pull some or a lot of their money out, there may be price declines, inadequate replenishment of bonds, and a fall in the levels of currency and foreign reserves.

A few countries may face a new financial crisis.

A new vulnerability in many emerging economies is the rapid build-up of external debt in the form of bonds denominated in the local currency.

The Asian crisis two decades ago taught that over-borrowing in foreign currency can create difficulties in debt repayment should the local currency level fall.

To avoid this, many countries sold bonds denominated in the local currency to foreign investors.

However, if the bonds held by foreigners are large in value, the country will still be vulnerable to the effects of a withdrawal.

As an example, almost half of Malaysian government securities, denominated in ringgit, are held by foreigners.

Though the country does not face the risk of having to pay more in ringgit if there is a fall in the local currency, it may have other difficulties if foreigners withdraw their bonds.

What is the state of the world economy, what are the chances of a new financial crisis, and how would the Asian countries like Malaysia fare?

These are big and relevant questions to ponder 20 years after the start of the Asian crisis and nine years after the global crisis.

But we will have to consider them in another article.


By Martin Khor Global Trend

Martin Khor (director@southcentre.org) is executive director of the South Centre. The views expressed here are entirely his own.


Related Links:

Royal Commission of Inquiry to probe 1990s forex losses - Nation ..







Related posts

The government is moving ahead to investigate whether there were any wrongdoings in the massive foreign exchange losses suffered by Ba...


Unique gift: Ahmad Shabery (centre) presenting kain songket made of pineapple fibre to China’s General Administration of Quality Supervi...